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Moving from rational to normative ideologies of control over 
public involvement: A case of continued managerial 
dominance 
Abstract 
Public Involvement (PI) is a strategic priority in global healthcare settings, yet 
can be seen as peripheral during decision making processes. Whilst extant 
research acknowledges variations in how policy is translated into practice, the 
majority attribute it to the limiting influence of professional hierarchies on the 
perceived ‘legitimacy’ of PI. Drawing on examples of three commissioning 
organisations within the English NHS, we outline how the variance in policy 
implementation for PI can be attributed to influence from the managers rather 
than professionals. In doing so we explore how rational ideologies of managerial 
control negatively impact PI. However, we also illustrate how PI alluded to in 
policy can be more successfully realised when organisational managers enact 
normative ideologies of control.  Notwithstanding this assertion, we argue 
managerial domination exists even in the case of normative ideologies of control, 
to the detriment of more radical PI in service development.  
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Introduction 
Public involvement (PI) is a global priority in healthcare settings and is assumed 
to empower communities, improve service decisions, provide democratic 
accountability and contribute to higher quality services (Barnes et al, 2003; 
Gustafsson & Driver, 2005). Despite the benefits of PI for health and social care 
services (Mockford et al 2011), much existing research suggests that, while there 
is strong policy support, its potential contribution is stymied by contested 
terminology, limitations in the underpinning evidence base, different attitudes to 
PI, and variable attempts at implementation (Staniszewska et al 2011, Baggott, 
2005; Contandriopoulos, 2004). Commentators note the impact of professional 
hierarchies on the translation of PI policy into practice in public sector 
organisations (Boivin et al, 2014; Litva et al., 2002; Martin, 2011; Rutter et al, 
2004), but neglect the impact of managerial influences on PI (Renedo et al, 
2015). This is surprising, considering recent research highlights how PI 
representatives attempt to increase their influence by working more closely with 
managers (El Enany et al, 2013), suggesting changes in managerial context may 
represent a means by which to enhance involvement.  
 
In this paper, we outline three cases from healthcare commissioning 
organisations which reflect variation in managerial influences on PI, and 
highlight the positive, or negative, impacts on involvement from each case. Our 
analysis suggests organisational managers should refrain from attempting to 
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implement policy recommendations by actively creating PI roles and structures 
for involvement, as such rational ideologies of control (Barley and Kunda, 1992) 
limit PI contributions. However, we also outline how normative ideologies of 
managerial control enhance PI when groups are encouraged to work outside of 
managerially framed roles, increasing their contribution and influence over 
service design and delivery. While PI contributions are still subject to the 
dominance of managerial influence, we discuss how normative approaches may 
enhance the potential for the collaborative nature of PI alluded to in policy. In 
doing so, our paper responds to calls for an exploration of PI in different health 
settings, particularly in relation to how managers influence PI (El Enany et al., 
2013; Renedo et al., 2015).  
Public Involvement  
In the context of healthcare, multiple policy documents emphasise the need for 
representative, comprehensive involvement of ‘the public’ (HSCA, 2014; DOH, 
2010; NHS England, 2013). In this paper we consider examples from the English 
National Health Service (NHS), but the need for PI in healthcare is evident 
globally (Barnes, 1999; Church et al., 2002).  
 
Despite a political focus on the need for PI, definitions of PI are vague, with little 
consensus over who should be involved in public decision making processes, at 
what level, and what form that involvement should take. While involvement in 
healthcare research settings has developed with a clear architecture and policy 
support (Staniszewska et al, 2011), development of PI in health service 
development has been more diverse. In health service development, a lack of 
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consensus of terminology, and overlapping structures (Mockford et al, 2011), 
potentially undermine PI, limiting the ability of the public to influence, or 
contribute appropriately to, strategic discussions (Baggott, 2005). However, 
others suggest that limitations of PI, such as perceived lack of impact on 
organisational outcomes (Contandriopoulos, 2004), cannot be associated 
entirely with the coherence of policy or the structures in place to encourage PI. 
Indeed, Martin (2008a) argues there is no need for comprehensive policy 
recommendations, as guidance is coherent but allows flexibility for interpretive 
involvement in different settings. The ambiguity of policy allows PI to be framed 
in different ways, encompassing multiple definitions of the ‘public’ as patients, 
carers, service users, communities, tax payers and citizens (Martin, 2008b), 
opening different avenues of interpretation of the meaning of ‘involvement’. In 
this paper we follow Martin’s definition, and use the term ‘public involvement’ to 
encompass multiple definitions of participants and their contributions.   
 
Despite the flexibility of policy, and the potential for interpretation in different 
settings, research situated across multiple healthcare organisational contexts 
criticises the way PI is operationalised as tokenistic, not central to decision 
making processes, and even constructed as a mechanism for manipulating the 
public, rather than empowering them (Baggott, 2005). Considering the 
problematic translation of policy into practice, many attribute limitations of PI to 
the influence of professional hierarchies on the involvement, or exclusion, of 
members of the public during decision making processes (Litva et al., 2002; 
Rutter et al., 2004). The influence of professionals within healthcare 
organisations frames institutionalised assumptions about types of ‘legitimate’ 
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knowledge, undermining the perceived legitimacy of PI (Boivin et al., 2014; 
Learmonth et al., 2009; Martin & Finn, 2011).  
 
Whilst the influence of professionals on PI is well documented, there is little 
exploration of how managerially defined contexts influence involvement in 
professionalised settings. Recent work has suggested that managerial 
involvement in PI, for example creating managerially defined structures through 
which involvement occurs, may enhance PI influence or credibility within 
healthcare organisations by reframing their role as ‘experts in layity’ (El Enany et 
al., 2013; Martin, 2008a). However, the influence of what Barley and Kunda 
(1992) term ‘rational’ ideologies of control, whereby systems are tightly 
structured by managers, and the consequences of constraining involvement to 
managerially framed positions, are unclear. On the one hand, rational ideologies 
of control may realise the aims of policy by providing structure and meaning to 
PI groups, encouraging outputs relating to institutional priorities, which could be 
positive for PI contributions (Martin, 2011). On the other hand, framing PI roles 
in managerial structures as partners, rather than independent critical voices, 
could risk a loss of the distinctiveness of the PI, limiting contributions to self-
legitimisation strategies for managerial agendas (Boivin et al., 2014; Learmonth 
et al., 2009).  In other words, PI representatives run the risk of being co-opted 
towards managerial interests during decision making processes, which counters  
policy aims for their involvement. To explore this issue further, we consider PI in 
healthcare commissioning organisations.  
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Public Involvement in Commissioning  
In this paper we consider three illuminating cases from commissioning 
organisations (who plan and contract for healthcare provision) in England. 
Whilst the following explanation of organisational arrangements is specific to the 
English NHS, similar approaches to PI are seen globally in healthcare settings 
where provider, purchaser and consumer are separated (Barnes et al., 2003; 
Church et al., 2002). 
 
In the English NHS, PI is reflected in policy advocating patient choice and shared 
decision making, from the individual level of care to the development and 
improvement of health services (DoH, 2010; NHS England, 2013). The 
importance of PI is also reflected in recent organisational reforms that have seen 
the introduction of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), which lead 
commissioning networks (DoH, 2011). CCGs have a central focus on the 
involvement of community physicians (General Practitioners or GPs) and service 
users in commissioning decisions, driving patient-focused decision-making, 
theoretically autonomous from top-down control.  
 
The new commissioning arrangements, in particular the renewed focus on public 
and clinical involvement, distinguishes CCGs from their commissioning 
predecessors, which were criticised for being managerially focused, with limited, 
tokenistic engagement with the public (Callaghan & Wistow, 2006; Martin, 
2011). This is reflected in the new legal requirements for commissioning 
organisations to engage with the public at multiple stages of the commissioning 
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process (HSCA, 2014). However, reflecting other policies relating to PI, the 
interpretation of what PI ‘is’, or how the public should be integrated into 
commissioning decisions, is vague. Commentators suggest this ambiguity is key 
to the new organisations, as they theoretically have more autonomy and 
flexibility from top-down control, creating contexts which have the potential to 
develop PI according to their local needs and organisational cultures (Hudson, 
2014). 
 
Commissioning organisations offer insight into the varying managerial 
influences on PI, as policy will be interpreted and implemented within an 
organisational context influenced by local managerial structures and priorities. 
As such, they offer a context from which to explore the research question: What 
are the consequences of co-opting PI representatives into managerially defined 
roles?  
Methods 
The overarching study was concerned with enhancing decision making 
processes for commissioning organisations, specifically related to interventions 
to reduce avoidable admissions of older people into hospital. The three cases 
presented in this study are illuminating for research into PI, as senior managers 
in each organisation were explicit about the commitment of their organisation to 
implementing PI policy. Despite this, over the course of the study, distinct 
variations in managerial interventions shaping PI involvement were noted, 
leading to different outcomes for PI influence on service development at each 
site.  
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The three cases offer insight into influences on PI, as they have similar 
organisational and professional structures framing involvement processes. All 
three commissioning organisations had formalised structures for public 
engagement at four levels. Each community physician’s surgery had a patient 
reference group, one representative of which attended the PI group at the 
commissioning organisation. In addition to the PI group, each commissioning 
organisation appointed at least one lay member to the governing body. Alongside 
internal PI structures, the 3 organisations also engaged in wider consultation 
with the general public in their local geographical area. The four mechanisms 
supporting PI are outlined in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
In other words, structural, professional or political influences did not vary 
between the cases. As such, and in the context of extant research, the research 
team inductively concluded the potential for variation might stem from local 
managerial influences on the implementation of PI policy. To explore these 
influences, the team conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals from 
the commissioning organisations, including: managers, clinicians, lay members 
of the board, and PI representatives from level 2 of the PI structure illustrated in 
Table 1. We asked participants to describe how information or opinions were 
acquired from the public, and through what structures this took place; how 
feedback was used with other forms of data to determine the needs of the local 
community; how information from PI was used to design services; and what the 
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influences on PI were. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour and 
were audio recorded and transcribed. Interview numbers and job types of those 
interviewed are outlined in Table 2.  In addition, the team attended two PI 
meetings at each site, to observe how meetings were conducted and explore the 
level of managerial control over meetings.  Extensive hand-written field notes 
were taken during observations. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Coding of interviews and field notes was guided by searching for in-vivo codes 
related to managerial attitudes towards PI, examples of the way PI influenced 
service design or delivery, and indications and implications of co-option of PI 
representatives into managerially determined roles. Over successive rounds our 
coding became more theoretical and we induced themes of rational and 
normative ideologies of managerial control (Barley & Kunda, 1992), as 
empirically illustrated below. 
Findings 
We present the findings for each case, within which we highlight variation in 
managerial interventions for involvement, and the consequences for PI influence 
in decision-making processes around service development.   
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Case 1: Rational ideologies of managerial control 
The following extract is taken from field notes taken at the second PI group 
meeting attended by the research team 
 
The group was asked by the lay chair to identify what they feel their 
contribution to the CCG should represent. There was a lot of confusion 
amongst members about their potential contribution… The chair had 
difficulty keeping the group on point… Two general managers attended 
the meeting, and they were responsible for setting the agenda. By the end 
of the meeting the managers had taken over the running of the session to 
ensure all the agenda items were discussed in a more structured manner 
(Field Notes: 11/04/2014) 
 
This observation of the PI group at this site highlights two influences on PI: 
confusion amongst public representatives about their role and potential 
contribution to the organisation; and the dominance of managerial control over 
the group. The management team took over the running of the PI meeting as the 
group was not seen to be conforming to the agenda pre-determined by the 
managers. When interviewed about the PI group, a general manager said:  
 
It is hard work… We’ve spent countless hours doing terms of reference, 
loads of time explaining what their role is… they don’t necessarily 
understand how the NHS works so that’s part of the problem… people’s 
understanding of the health system is actually really quite minimal and 
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they don’t understand all the inter-organisational arrangements 
(Interview 5 - General Manager) 
 
The perception on behalf of the management team, reflected above, seemed to be 
that the PI group was not informed enough about the NHS to contribute in a 
meaningful way to decisions made by the commissioning organisation. Indeed, 
the manager notes how they spent time ‘explaining what their role is’ to the 
group, limiting PI contribution to a managerially determined role, rather than 
encouraging the group to determine a role for themselves. In addition, the 
perception that they had ‘minimal’ understanding of the issues in the health 
service often led to derisive comments from managers during discussions about 
PI:  
 
They’ll randomly email me going “Oh (manager’s name), have you seen 
this thing about telehealth?” and I’m like “Oh god.”… they don’t 
understand the priorities or the organisation, so it’s really difficult to 
manage them (Interview 7 – General Manager) 
 
Again, the suggestion above is that the PI group need to be ‘managed’, associated 
with which managers did not accommodate PI contributions outside those 
considered to be managerially defined organisational priority. The influence of 
the hierarchical organisational context in encouraging rational ideologies of 
control was illuminated by many of the managers interviewed, who suggested 
they often limited PI to smaller, peripheral discussions, rather than involvement 
in strategic decision making. Consequently, there was relative diminishing 
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potential for the PI group to influence decision making processes. This sentiment 
was also voiced by doctors involved in the commissioning organisation, 
suggesting the hierarchical organisational context encouraged rational 
ideologies of control across professional groups, as well as managers:  
 
I think them feeling involved is probably the best that we can do. They 
don’t necessarily have all the information or the knowledge and 
experience to make the decisions that we would make as health 
professionals and they do make some really valid points but it’s really 
peripheral stuff to be honest (Interview 9 – General Practitioner) 
 
Consequently, PI involvement in decision making processes was marginalised, 
and the management team characterised PI in a way which suggested they did 
not see much strategic value in any PI contribution:   
 
They want better plates or something ridiculous... But then again, you see, 
if you’re a member of the public and you know nothing, like a lot of them 
don’t really about how the NHS works, then why shouldn’t they bring 
these things up? It’s not really that helpful for us though, it doesn’t change 
the way we work (Interview 3 – General Manager) 
 
As noted by the manager interviewed above, PI contributions were not viewed as 
changing organisational processes. During interviews, none of the managers or 
PI representatives could give examples of the way ideas from the PI groups 
influenced development of services. In addition, there was little capacity for new 
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ideas to be generated from the PI groups, as the management team set the 
agenda, constraining PI contributions to managerially determined issues. As 
such, the potential for new, or different, ideas to emerge from the PI group was 
limited: 
 
There aren’t many things that come up that don’t really fit with the main 
themes because we set the agenda to make sure that what they’re 
discussing fits with the main themes (Interview 3 – General Manager) 
 
On the one hand, organisational managers were aware of the need to engage in 
PI in line with national policy. However, their interpretation of policy led them to 
engage in rational ideologies of control, which constrained the PI group, only 
allowing them to contribute through formally determined, and managerially led, 
discussions. For many PI representatives the lack of flexibility for their 
involvement led to feelings of frustration, and questions about their potential for 
strategic influence: 
 
It’s difficult to see how you make a difference really. I think a lot of the 
time the managers just sit there and nod their heads, they don’t hear us. 
And we’re not supposed to talk about a lot of things, just stick to the 
agenda or you get into trouble! (Interview 10 – PI representative) 
 
However, the chair of the group, who also represented the PI group as a lay 
representative of the commissioning board, described how he felt he was 
involved in strategic level discussions. An experienced manager in the private 
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sector, he had been appointed as chair of the group by commissioning managers, 
who identified him as ‘our champion for public and patient involvement’ 
(Interview 1 – General Manager).  As such, the chair felt he could use his 
professional background, and the influence afforded to him by his managerially 
appointed position, to contribute to managerial decisions:  
 
I have some skills from a professional management point of view… So as a 
non-exec sitting on the board I’m able to say “Well, why do you do it that 
way? Have you thought of…?” So I’m able to put constructive challenge 
into the system (Interview 2 –Lay member) 
 
Therefore, by drawing on previous experience of management within different 
organisational contexts, the PI representative achieved more strategic influence 
by working within a managerially framed role. However, he was also aware that 
to retain this influence and his position given to him by managers, he had to 
behave in a way that aligned with managerial interests or accepted behaviours, 
influencing the way he communicated information from other PI representatives 
to commissioning managers. In this way, he could be seen to replicate forms of 
rational control over his PI group members:  
 
If I go to that board with a proposal which is unrealistic, then I’ve failed… 
I have to go back to the (PI group) and say is “It’s all very well coming up 
with these ideas. How do we fund it?” They have a responsibility as well. 
They can’t just say “We want a cancer consultant on our doorstep every 
day of the week” like sometimes they do… So if I take it into the board I 
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have to make sure it is credible. If it’s not, then I’m going to get thrown 
out and rightly so. I’ll have a fight and I won’t be taken seriously 
(Interview 2 – Lay member) 
 
In summary, case 1 represents an organisational context in which PI is 
influenced by the constraints of rational ideologies of managerial control, which 
framed opportunities for PI. An organisational context, which did not prioritise 
the potential for PI outside of formal structures, meant that managers set the 
agenda to limit PI contributions to peripheral issues, rather than strategic 
decision making processes. Consequently, there were no examples of the PI 
group influencing the commissioning organisation at a strategic level. Whilst the 
managerially appointed chair of the group felt they had influence, this was 
related to their ability to work in a way consistent with managerial expectations, 
due to their professional background, previous experience, and a position 
bestowed on them by the commissioning managers. The need to act in a way 
aligned with managerial interest, through channels determined by rational 
ideologies of control, subsequently influenced the type of information the lay 
member communicated between the PI group and the management team, as the 
chair himself replicated forms of managerial dominance. 
 
Case 2 – Increasing recognition of the potential of public involvement 
In case 2, characterising their attitude towards PI as a ‘supportive culture’, 
managers were keen to communicate the importance of PI within the 
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organisation, highlighting that their organisational context encouraged and 
recognised potential benefits of PI in service design and delivery:  
 
If we actually end up designing services or commissioning services that 
have got strong, local backing it’s going to make it ten times easier to 
actually put those services in place because you can say “Well actually, 
we’ve got the backing of the general public here and this has all been 
informed.” Yes, we’ve been influenced by our clinicians and the GPs, but 
particularly the public. (Interview 7 – General Manager) 
 
However, whilst all managers claimed they valued PI, some voiced concerns over 
the level of understanding of PI representatives about the commissioning 
organisation, and the context of the wider health system. Similar to case 1, some 
managers acknowledged that a lack of awareness of the wider organisational 
landscape could limit PI: 
 
What’s practically quite hard is having to go over things that we’ve 
already talked about, and so something maybe you talked about three 
weeks ago you then spend half the meeting going through it again. It’s 
quite time consuming and can be quite frustrating (Interview 13 – 
General Manager) 
 
Despite what was characterised as a more supportive managerial culture, 
managers resorted to rational ideologies of control, and limited PI to topics or 
contributions determined by the management team. However, the chief 
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executive of this organisation suggested that such control was not due to a 
reluctance to involve the public in strategic decisions, but about identifying the 
most relevant opportunities for involvement, arguably enhancing their 
contribution towards decision-making:  
 
There is always a line to be drawn between what is operational detail that 
we sort out every day, kind of day to day stuff, and what is really 
important, relevant stuff that the public ought to know about… So 
sometimes it’s not conducive to ask them about it (Interview 11 – Chief 
Executive) 
 
Whilst managers acknowledged that their dominance could limit the 
involvement of PI, trying to focus the contribution by involving them in ‘relevant’ 
discussions, they suggested their organisational culture was one which valued PI. 
Diverging from the findings in case 1, where organisational approaches to 
control trivialised PI, leading to concerns from PI representatives that they had 
no real involvement, PI representatives in case 2 seemed more satisfied with 
their contribution. In particular, they suggested that they were able to challenge 
managerial decisions, and raise issues outside of the managerially determined 
agenda:    
 
I think they’ve realised that we are a real asset so, you know, I think we’ve 
got a good working relationship… they’re very welcoming and, you know, 
we can be very challenging and raise some really difficult questions, but 
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then they do try and seek the answers. We can ask about anything really 
(Interview 4 –PI Representative) 
 
However, despite positive attitudes towards PI in case 2, which might have 
engendered more normative forms of control, the way in which PI influenced 
structure and recruitment to the PI group was tightly controlled by 
commissioning managers. PI representatives were not able to offer contributions 
to the commissioners outside of the boundaries of managerially controlled 
mechanisms for involvement: 
 
I was appointed by the commissioners to the committee…. So the 
public interact with (PI) committee; the (PI) committee collates the 
information and then we transmit this in one way or another to the 
clinical commissioning group (Interview 2 – PI representative). 
 
This was particularly frustrating for one PI representative, who acknowledged 
the organisational context was supportive of PI when occurring within 
controlled strictures, but questioned the extent to which he could contribute to 
wider issues: 
 
They didn’t discourage me from doing research, but they couldn’t say if a 
layman like myself could carry out something… so now as an active 
member, quite active and outspoken, I’m still feeling somewhat tagged 
on… Are we really important or is it all window dressing? I’m allowed to 
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have an opinion but only on topics they allow me to. So I just wonder what 
my contribution is (Interview 1 –PI Representative)  
 
Therefore, whilst more anecdotally committed to PI than case 1, PI was still 
influenced through rational ideologies of control from management, limiting 
involvement to a small number of pre-selected topics. Whilst some PI 
representatives were satisfied with their involvement, perceiving the 
organisational context as one which supported and valued PI, others felt limited 
in their contribution. As such, whilst the managers in this organisation were 
attempted to enhance PI, facilitating involvement where it could have the most 
impact, continuing managerial dominance through rational ideologies of control 
had the potential to exclude PI representatives from involvement in more 
strategic issues. This led to some members feeling ‘tagged on’ and not integral to 
the commissioning process.  
 
Case 3 – The potential of normative control 
Case 3 is notable due to the different approach to the implementation of PI policy 
taken by the management team. At this site, the managerial culture encouraged a 
more normative approach to the organisation and control of the PI group. 
Managers were significantly less controlling in a formal sense and described 
themselves as holding a greater commitment towards the diverse viewpoints 
that PI potentially brought in to decision-making. They thus claimed a ‘hands off’ 
approach to PI, although we later note such an approach may merely represent  a 
more subtle form of managerial dominance.  
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The management team was not actively involved in the development of agenda 
or running of meetings, and the PI group had a small budget provided by the 
commissioning organization, which they could use for their own purposes (such 
as room bookings, transport, small research projects).  In addition, the PI group 
themselves elected a chair and determined their recruitment strategy 
independently from managerial control:  
 
We decided to try and have a representative body and my original 
thought was that we’d have a group with one representative from 
each of the patient participation groups and any special interest 
groups would bring in a representative… The other thing we did, we 
decided that if people showed a strong enough interest that we’d 
take on a few independent members. So we have about three or four 
independent members who are there because they’ve got a great 
interest in the health service and wanted to do something (Interview 
2 -  PI Representative) 
 
Despite the apparent lack of direct involvement from the commissioning 
managers, the PI representatives reported excellent relationships with 
management. Some representatives had been involved under previous 
organisational structures, and noted the difference under the new 
commissioning arrangements:  
 
(Previous organisations) were very much management led… they tended 
to do things on business lines rather than on patient need lines…. 
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everything was organised because that seemed like the right way to make 
it easy for somebody who was organising it rather than “What actually 
are we trying to get out of this? What does the patient really need?”…. So I 
have seen a major shift, yeah (Interview 1 – PI Representative) 
 
Rather than determining the topics the PI group should be involved in, the 
management staff allowed the group to discuss issues they felt were important. 
This encouraged the generation of new ideas for service development:  
 
We don’t tell the PI group what to discuss, they come up with the ideas 
and set their own agenda, arrange their own meetings. And sometimes 
they’re used as a sounding board, so they will often come up with ideas, 
very good ideas which we will use in commissioning design (Interview 7 – 
General Manager) 
 
During interviews, managers noted that their normative approaches to control, 
claiming they set aside organisational hierarchy and encouraged a collaborative 
ethos, not only enhanced the PI contribution, but developed a sense of 
organisational belonging or ownership amongst PI representatives. This 
subsequently influenced the implementation of the services in a wider public 
setting:  
 
If you use patients to help in the design you may still end up with the same 
result, but because you’ve taken patients along with you they will go out 
and defend it themselves… at a public meeting somebody was having a go 
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at our CCG over something and one of the guys from the patient group 
stood up and defended it because he’d been in on the inside and said 
“You’ve totally got this wrong. They’re doing it this way.” So it shows it 
does work (Interview 13 – General Manager) 
 
In contrast with cases 1 and 2, both managers and PI representatives 
interviewed in this case could give explicit examples of episodes when PI had 
influenced service design, or had been clearly involved in strategic decision 
making processes. As noted above, this encouraged a sense of organisational 
commitment, ownership of services, and instilled a feeling amongst PI 
representatives that they were able to contribute at all levels of commissioning 
processes. This was reflected in an example from one of the PI representatives 
who was concerned with the local ambulance service, and as a result undertook 
their own research, independent of the commissioning organisation. After 
developing a paper, and arguing a case for change in the way services were being 
delivered, the PI representative distributed it to the PI group, the board of the 
commissioning organisation, and the board of the local ambulance service:  
 
I sent a paper off to the chief executives because I’ve been concerned 
about the lack of data transparency from the ambulance service… So I 
wrote a paper and it’s very challenging potentially… but I’m not 
constrained from doing that and if I’ve chosen to do that that’s fine… I’ve 
pursued it, asked questions… My objective would be that people can make 
informed decisions about whether they think they’re getting quality out of 
 23 
the ambulance service and I think that will help the CCG (Interview 10 –PI 
Representative) 
 
The above example illustrates how a the more collaborative ethos towards PI 
encouraged representatives to become more actively involved in strategic issues 
outside of formalised, managerially determined roles. As a result, ideas or 
opinions evolve, which may not otherwise have been facilitated. A second 
example of the positive influence of PI was illustrated in design for a respiratory 
(COPD) service:   
 
One of the chief executives came to me and said they’d been looking at the 
plans I’d sent them for a project on COPD, and they wanted my input in 
developing the service… it’s now showing something like a 17% reduction 
in unplanned admissions. Well, if you add up £3,000 or £4,000 a time 
that’s a lot of money we’re saving… So the patients are benefiting and the 
CCG are benefiting because the patients are benefiting (Interview 4 –PI 
Representative) 
 
By having the confidence (and managerial encouragement) to send ideas or 
project proposals, which may not be managerial priorities, to the management 
team of the organisation, PI encouraged the development of a new service, 
subsequently resulting in patient benefit and cost savings. If the PI 
representative in this case had been constrained by managerial priorities, 
reflected in cases 1 and 2 that were characterised by rational control, the service 
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would have been unlikely to be developed, as it was not part of the immediate 
managerial agenda.  
 
PI representatives in case 3 seemed aware that their potential influence within 
the CCG was not reflective of the types of involvement in other areas. As a result, 
some members within the PI group were reluctant to work with other ‘less 
credible’ PI groups, in case that undermined their influence. This aversion to 
actions that may reduce their level of influence within the commissioning 
process was noted in field notes, during a discussion at a PI group meeting about 
the potential for collaboration with a neighbouring organisation: 
 
Discussion about collaboration with (neighbouring organisation). 
Everyone becomes very animated and derogatory about the PI reps in 
neighbouring area. Many people appear concerned that the other group 
have less ‘credibility’ as patient representatives, and that they do not take 
their role as seriously. A number of people suggest that they are “not the 
same as us” an “don’t know how to work with their CCG in the best way’” 
Someone says they are just “yes men” and will not challenge managers 
(Field Notes 09/11/13) 
 
 
The PI group seemed aware that their influence came from their ability to work 
alongside commissioning managers, but remain outside of managerially 
determined roles. Working in an organisation with a more normative approach 
from managers towards their contribution did not require PI representatives to 
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work within rationally controlled involvement structures, and afforded them 
freedom to think more innovatively about service design, as they were not 
constrained to managerial priorities or visions. The distinction with the 
neighbouring group was the latter were seen as being particularly influenced by 
an more hierarchical that privileged managerial priorities: 
 
In (the other organisation) they’re appointed by management…. there’s a 
completely different culture and the people will all be yes men… The thing 
is when you suggest something the people from (the other organisation) 
will put all the obstacles in the way and the people from here will say 
“Well why can’t we do it? What’s stopping us?”… You see, I wouldn’t hear 
“We can’t do that” from us, but I would from them (Interview 6 –PI 
Representative) 
 
The PI representatives were aware of the unique freedom afforded to them by 
commissioning management team, enhancing their influence and potential 
contribution. Their aversion to working with managerially controlled groups was 
due to concerns that they may find their influence lessened by increased 
pressure to conform to managerial priorities. However, the PI group were also 
keen to help educate others, and encourage them to work independently of 
managerial agenda. This was highlighted during interviews by an awareness of 
their role in developing influential PI representatives for the future:  
 
I’ve been to meetings and I’ve asked questions and I’ve heard somebody 
say afterwards “He shouldn’t have asked that question. He knew the 
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answer.” Yes, I did know the answer, but half of the people there didn’t 
which is why I asked the question and they wouldn’t have known to ask 
the question… So that’s where I see my role. I see my role now bringing 
those people along, helping them along so we’ve got some people who can 
question things in the future (Interview 10 –PI Representative) 
 
In conclusion, case 3 illustrates the potential for innovative PI when it is subject 
to normative, rather than rational, ideologies of control, meaning it is not 
constrained by managerially determined ways of working, realising the aims of 
PI policy. By being able to work outside of rationally controlled roles, whilst 
maintaining supportive relationships with commissioning managers due to 
normative control, PI representatives could inform commissioning processes at a 
strategic level and had a clear influence on the development of services. In 
addition to encouraging organisational commitment, and ownership of services 
within the wider public, normative control of the PI group enhanced the ability of 
the commissioning organisation to design responsive services, resulting in 
positive outcomes, such as the COPD service.  
Discussion  
The three cases outlined in this paper reflect a variance in the interpretation of 
PI policy in commissioning organisations. In our findings, we outlined how this 
variance was related to managerial influences on the way policy was interpreted 
in practice, reflected by rational or normative ideologies of control (Barley & 
Kunda, 1992), which shaped the PI agenda and topics of contribution. We now 
explore these findings in the context of existing research.   
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In case 1, PI was limited by the organisational context, which encouraged 
rational ideologies of managerial control. Often suggesting PI was a peripheral 
element of commissioning processes, managers attempted to implement policy 
through a directive and constraining approach, meaning that PI was not 
integrated into strategic decision making.  By determining the agenda for the PI 
group, and taking over meetings that deviated from their agenda, these 
managers parallel research findings about limiting actions of professionals 
towards PI (Baggott, 2005; Boivin et al., 2014; Callaghan & Wistow, 2006). Whilst 
one PI representative, also involved as a lay member of the organisation board, 
suggested they had some level of influence with managerial staff, this was only 
achieved by co-option into a managerially framed role. By drawing on previous 
managerial experience, the lay member conformed to managerial control in ways 
that made him seem ‘credible’ to managers. However, as a result, the ideas he 
communicated from the PI group to the governing body were tempered by a 
desire to retain that credibility. Our analysis supports previous research that 
argues incorporation of PI into managerially controlled governance structures 
undermines the distinctiveness of public engagement, as representatives become 
co-opted towards managerial interests, replicating forms of rational control, 
rather than acting as critical challengers to managerial decision-making  (Martin, 
2011).  
 
Case 2 represented a more complex picture of the implementation of PI policy, in 
which commissioning managers stated their organisation had a commitment to 
PI, but where they struggled to move away from rational ideologies of control. In 
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case 2, managers determined the nature of PI, and the way representatives were 
‘allowed’ to work into the organisation. For some PI representatives, the positive 
organisational attitude towards PI, and the feeling that their opinions and ideas 
were taken on board to some extent, resulted in feelings of satisfaction with their 
level of involvement. Litva et al (2002) term this type of PI ‘accountable 
consultation’, in which PI contributions continue to be influenced by managerial 
priorities and agendas, but through which public opinion is expressed and the 
rationale for managerial decisions is fed back to the PI group. Such accountable 
consultation appears to be the most dominant model through which PI policy is 
implemented in the public sector (see Martin, 2011; Rutter et al, 2004), where 
managerial structures can give structure and meaning to PI groups and 
encourage involvement where it would be most appropriate (as defined by the 
management team). In a sense, the managerial approach in case 2 was moving 
toward a more normative form of control, encouraging a sense of ownership and 
commitment to organisational goals.  
 
However, whilst some PI representatives in case 2 were satisfied with 
accountable consultation, more active or outspoken members were frustrated by 
their inability to contribute outside of managerially determined topics. As noted 
by one respondent, who desired to take on independent research, this 
undermined the potential contribution of PI, limiting the empowerment of 
representatives, which is a political aim of PI (Barnes et al., 2003; Gustafsson & 
Driver, 2005). Therefore, whilst there was an awareness of the need for a 
normative approach to integrate PI, rational managerial control continued to 
manipulate PI outputs, encouraging conformity, rather than innovation, through 
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engagement. In these settings, despite rhetoric of normative control, managers 
continued to engage in rational control to determine who is involved in PI, what 
contribution they can make, and how that contribution is interpreted within  
decisions that align with managerial priorities (Baggott, 2005; Rutter et al., 
2004). This contrasts with contexts such as health research, where a more 
normative approach encourages a focus on active collaboration and co-
production of knowledge, and where PI representatives define the research 
agenda (INVOLVE 2012).  
 
In contrast to cases 1 and 2, managers in case 3 demonstrated a more normative 
approach to the implementation of PI policy. Rather than determining the 
agenda, or distinguishing appropriate structures for involvement, the managerial 
staff offered support for the group to develop a context which facilitated 
involvement on their own terms, and subsequently worked to integrate the 
outputs of the group into service design. As a result of this normative control, 
and a relative absence of rational control, we found examples of two occasions 
on which PI involvement led to the design, or evaluation, of a service. In one case, 
related to the development of a respiratory service, this resulted in a decrease in 
urgent admissions, enhancing cost effectiveness and patient experience.   
 
The PI representatives in case 3 could be conceptualised as becoming ‘expert’ 
representatives. Previous research suggests that experienced PI representatives 
undergo a process of professionalisation, enhancing their credibility and ability 
to influence at a strategic level of decision-making around service development  
(El Enany et al., 2013; Martin, 2008a). However, El Enany et al (2013) suggest 
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this professionalisation process requires PI representatives to align with 
managerial influence, becoming co-opted into rationally controlled managerial 
structures to gain influence. Whilst this is reflective of our findings in case 1 and 
2, the representatives in case 3 were distinct due to their lack of co-option into 
managerially framed roles, enabling them to influence topics which were not 
necessarily part of the managerial agenda (such as the ambulance service), and 
developing service in domains that may not otherwise have been addressed 
(such as COPD interventions).  
 
The importance of an organisational context that supports normative control 
was highlighted by the reluctance of the group in case 3 to work with a 
neighbouring PI group, who they believed were rationally controlled by their 
respective managers. On the surface, our findings could support conclusions of El 
Enany et al (2013) that professionalised PI experts become complicit in the 
active selection of the ‘right’ participants for PI, whilst excluding others to 
protect their jurisdiction. In this sense one could argue that professionalised PI 
experts replicate forms of rational managerial control to limit others’ 
involvement. However, we also highlighted that the PI representatives in case 3 
wanted to help develop inexperienced individuals in normative ways, guiding 
them through meetings which may be unfamiliar, and encouraging them to 
continue to ask questions rather than become co-opted into managerial ways of 
thinking. Therefore, we argue that, rather than replicating forms of rational 
control, the PI representatives in case 3 were not distancing themselves from 
individuals who did not possess the ‘right’ types of knowledge, as suggested by El 
Enany et al (2013), but rather replicating forms of normative control. 
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The difference in organisational contexts encouraging rational or normative 
managerial control is an important factor in explaining the variance between the 
3 cases, highlighted by the potential for PI influence over service design as 
illustrated in case 3. However, it is also important to acknowledge the potential 
inhibitory influence of normative control. In all 3 cases, PI was framed by forms 
of managerial dominance. Whilst normative control fostered an environment 
that supported the collaborative PI alluded to in policy, the management team 
were still arguably shaping the nature of PI involvement and recruitment, albeit 
in a less directive way. This resonates with the work of Alvesson and Willmott 
(2002), who argue that normative managerial control works to influence 
employee commitment and reduce distinctiveness, encouraging them to work in 
ways congruent with managerial priorities. Therefore, whilst this paper 
highlights the importance of normative, rather than rational, control for realising 
innovative PI, we acknowledge the continuance of managerial dominance in 
shaping the nature of that contribution.  
 
Finally, whilst the organisational culture at the time of data collection supported 
normative control in case 3, the findings in this paper only offer a temporal 
snapshot in the turbulent, dynamic context of healthcare commissioning. 
Normative control, in the face of continuing pressures in healthcare to conform 
to performance management and governance structures, is unusual (Martin, 
2011), despite the potential for increased innovation in the commissioning and 
delivery of care. Indeed, one participant from case 3 highlighted the ongoing 
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spectre of rational control, suggesting that the organisational context had the 
potential to shape and constrain the nature of PI in the future:  
 
So we have arrived now in recent meetings where we now get copies of 
board meetings and highlight papers and god knows what, and frankly 
I think it’s a negative move, because whenever you end up with an 
agenda in a meeting that’s got umpteen items that are about 
somebody else’s meetings you end up with your own time being 
curtailed… the more you have to stick to the agenda, the more you 
have to constrain that freedom to move about (Interview 3 – PI 
Representative)  
 
Whilst it may be difficult to sustain organisational cultures promoting normative 
control of PI structures in the context of top-down performance pressures in 
healthcare, the three cases outlined in this paper demonstrate that a move away 
from rational control is necessary for the realisation of PI alluded to in policy 
documents.  Our findings emphasise that managerial dominance means that 
managers are responsible for creating organisational contexts that maximise the 
potential for PI influence during decision making processes. Supportive contexts 
offer the opportunity for PI representatives to replicate normative, rather than 
rational, control mechanisms with other, less expert, groups, further enhancing 
the potential for innovative PI.  
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Conclusion  
This paper has considered three interpretations of PI within the English NHS. 
Reflecting current policy, limited guidance on the operationalisation of PI, and 
the ability of commissioning organisations to determine their own organisational 
processes (HSCA, 2014; Hudson, 2014), we have shown how variance amongst 
policy implementation in commissioning groups can be attributed to the use of 
rational or normative ideologies of managerial control over PI. By demonstrating 
the potential benefits associated with normative control, we highlight the 
importance of developing an organisational context, which supports more 
normative approaches, and warn against the limitations of co-opting PI 
representatives into managerially determined processes through rational 
control.  
 
On the one hand, findings from case 3 offer prescriptions for the implementation 
of policy in healthcare organisations towards development of more innovative 
PI. In particular, we identify the need to encourage the development of ‘expert’ PI 
representatives, who can in turn teach others about the complexities of the 
organisational context through normative processes, without replicating rational 
control mechanisms to co-opt them into managerially dominated roles. Whilst 
previous research suggests that professionalised PI representatives may work to 
exclude others from involvement (El Enany et al., 2013), we argue that in 
organisational contexts, which support normative control, expert 
representatives will encourage others to become involved in more challenging 
ways, perpetuating future innovation.  
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However, our findings also highlight the continuing managerial dominance 
perpetuated by normative control. This is indicated by an absence of the 
potential case 4, that of more radical PI, which has been seen in the HIV/AIDS 
(Epstein, 1995) and anti-psychiatry (Crossley, 1998) social movements. By 
amassing different forms of credibility outside of managerially dominated 
structures, radical PI movements have the potential to become genuine 
participants in the development of health services, whilst at the same time 
advancing their own strategic goals (Epstein, 1995). The findings in this study do 
not reflect this type of PI. However, the commissioning context may be relatively 
distinctive in that it is removed from direct experience of healthcare delivery 
that most engages PI representatives. Epstein (1995) argues that radical PI, 
taking the form of social movements, occurs when a group constructs identities 
associated with a particular disease category, becoming experts to exert political 
influence. In the context of commissioning, the PI groups represent individuals 
with diverse healthcare experiences or identities tied with variable medical 
conditions. As such, without a strong collective identity, PI in commissioning may 
be more susceptible to managerial dominance. 
 
Our conclusions support the argument of (Martin, 2008a), who advocates for 
flexible policy guidance, leaving the nature of PI open to interpretation. Whilst 
UK commissioning organisations are now legally required to engage in PI (HSCA, 
2014), the nature of that involvement can be determined locally, reflecting the 
needs and skills available in the local community. Again, this relies on PI not 
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being co-opted into managerial governance structures, but allowed to develop 
normatively.  
 
Regarding further research, researchers may wish to draw on some of the 
normative approaches adopted in health services research (INVOLVE 2012), to 
explore how to encourage organisational cultures, such as those described in 
Cases 1 and 2, to develop from rational to more normative approaches 
behaviours to enhance PI. Notwithstanding our explanation for absence of more 
radical forms of PI free of managerial influence, we encourage future research to 
seek out such forms in commissioning structures and analyse its antecedents. In 
addition, this paper focuses on managerial influences on policy implementation, 
but future research should also consider the interplay between managers and PI 
representatives, and the reciprocal influence of PI representatives on managerial 
structures, where they themselves may replicate forms of managerial control 
over others.  
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